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Summary
Complexity has received wide attention from practitioners and 
academics alike. We have made significant progress in understanding 
the different aspects of complexity in projects, programmes, and 
portfolios. Yet there is still significant work to be done in bridging 
complexity concepts and managerial reality.
In this whitepaper, we discuss the aspects of complexity, how it impacts 
projects, programmes, and portfolios and what we can do about it. 
Drawing upon the emerging field of engineering systems, the paper 
helps us to understand the intricate nature of complexity, uncertainty, 
and human behaviour, covering both structural and dynamic 
dimensions. It further outlines the potential challenges in practices 
by connecting the abstract concepts and management approaches 
to concrete practical examples. Finally, it introduces cutting-edge tools and strategies for dealing with project 
complexity covering network analysis, systems dynamics, modularisation, antifragility, and mindfulness.
It is important to note that complexity management is not a “finished” body of knowledge. We can, therefore, 
only propose solutions to some aspects of the challenges we face in complexity management (e.g., network 
analysis and system dynamics), while we have to support other areas with “sensemaking models” that form 
the basis for future development of tools and methods (e.g., the differentiation between simple, complex, and 
chaotic project, programme, and portfolio environments that require fundamentally different management 
approaches—some of which we know already, some of which we do not know yet). We are interested in 
moving this agenda forward and believe that a continued strong cooperation between research and practice is 
fundamental in discovering novel approaches to embracing complexity of projects, programmes, and portfolios.
“For every complex 
problem, there is an 
answer that is clear, 
simple, and wrong.”
 ~ Popular adaptation of 
a statement by H.L. 
Mencken (1917)1
 1Mencken reportedly wrote: “There is always a well-known solution to every human problem—neat, plausible, and wrong.”
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What is “Complexity?”
A Systems-Oriented View on Complexity
In this whitepaper, we will be discussing the topic of 
complexity from a systems-oriented perspective. In 
particular, we are adopting the view articulated by de 
Weck, Roos, and Magee (2011) that our modern lives are 
governed by engineering systems that fulfil central societal 
functions—for example, our modern communication, 
transportation, healthcare, or energy generation 
and distribution systems. These systems are not just 
technical systems—they are socio-technical systems 
where people and technology are intertwined and have 
become dependent on one another. They are developed 
and deployed with the help of project, programme, and 
portfolio management techniques. These systems are 
governed and driven by three key factors:
 ■ Technical and organisational complexity: We have to manage people, their interfaces and relationships 
to one another, as well as components and interfaces of the technical elements of the system. The two 
are tightly coupled—for example, in engineering where team structures often correspond to the system 
module structure of a product.
 ■ Social intricacy of human behaviour: While we like to think of ourselves as rational beings, human 
behaviour is often driven by subconscious thought processes. These are not only relevant for, say, having 
us pick one cereal brand over another, but also govern how we face and react to our collective challenges 
as teams or society as a whole.
 ■ Uncertainty of long lifecycles: While a single product (say, cell phone) may have a lifecycle of a few 
years, they are part of systems with much longer lifecycles—for example, the companies that market 
them, the communication infrastructure of which they are a part, or the supply chain that extracts and 
processes the necessary raw materials. Due to the scale that human activity has reached, long-term 
lifecycle considerations have to be part of all of our activities. This, among other factors, increases the 
uncertainty to which our activities are exposed.
In this whitepaper, we are applying this thinking to complexity management in projects, programmes, and 
portfolios. For simplicity, and to make this document more readable, we will often only refer to projects, but the 
ideas we articulate apply to programmes and portfolios as well.
Key Insight: The technical domain 
has developed models and tools to 
tackle complexity. The engineering 
systems view is emerging to address 
both technical and social aspects. 
Project, programme, and portfolio 
management, particularly in their 
application to technical systems, 
can benefit from these complexity 
modelling and management tools.
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Complex or Complicated? Or Both?
In lay terms, “complex” and “complicated” are concepts 
often used to describe what is considered to be intricate 
or complicated. However, in order to advance our 
understanding of complexity, it is important to draw a 
clear distinction between these two ideas. (For additional 
insights on complexity see, for example, Holland, 1997; 
Johnson, 2007; Cilliers, 2000; de Weck, Roos, & Magee, 
2011).
Complexity as a property is typically defined as:
 ■ Containing multiple parts;
 ■ Possessing a number of connections between the parts;
 ■ Exhibiting dynamic interactions between the parts; and
 ■ The behaviour produced as a result of those interactions cannot be explained as the simple sum of the 
parts (emergent behaviour).
Without the right tools to analyse and understand them, complex systems become complicated: They confuse 
us, and we cannot control what happens or understand why. To “decomplicate” complexity, it is helpful to 
discern two aspects we will discuss in the following two sections (Maylor, Turner, & Murray-Webster, 2013):
 ■ Structural complexity referring to the number and types of elements and their relationships in the 
system, and 
 ■ Dynamic complexity, referring to the (often hard to predict) behaviour of a complex system.
Structural Complexity: Composition and Relationship of Project, 
Programme, and Portfolio Systems
Structural complexity concerns the number of project system 
parts and the degrees of difference between them, as well 
as the number and degrees of difference of the relationships 
between them. A simple example is the stakeholders of a 
project: A project becomes more complex as the number of 
stakeholders, and the differences between the stakeholders, 
increase. It also becomes more complex if the number of 
relevant relationships between stakeholders increases, and 
the types of relationships become more different (e.g., 
financial flow, information flow, material flow, control flow). 
An internal IT project that only concerns the communication 
between first- and second-level support has low stakeholder 
complexity. A programme that implements a new public 
health policy has a much more complex stakeholder landscape.
Understanding the structure of a system (i.e., its architecture) is a key building block to predicting the system’s 
behaviour.
Key Insight: The key objective of 
complexity management is to avoid 
complexity getting complicated, 
and our projects becoming chaotic 
as a consequence.
Key Insight: Complex systems 
consist of a varying number 
and type of elements, as well 
as a varying number and types 
of relationships between those 
elements. Number and types of 
elements and their relationships 
determine the structural 
complexity of a system.
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Dynamic Complexity: Behaviour and Dynamics of Project, Programme, 
and Portfolio Systems
A system can be analysed by looking at its structure 
as discussed above. But that only gives us one “static” 
snapshot of a particular point in time. Additionally, it is 
also possible to analyse and understand the system in 
terms of its behaviour and how it changes over time. 
While the idea of doing so is relatively straightforward, 
the actual analysis and interpretation are typically more 
difficult, What timeframe should be analysed? Do we only 
look at the dynamic behaviour and changes of the system 
elements, or also their relationships? And, what are the 
critical elements and relationships whose behaviour and 
change we need to monitor? Analyses like these typically 
take the form of computer models that “breathe life” into 
static models of the system’s structure.
However, some of the most important aspects of complex projects relate to their dynamic nature: How long 
is the project going to take? How are the stakeholder requirements going to develop and change? When do I 
increase and decrease staffing levels, and in which areas? And what are possible emerging behaviours, such as 
organisational resistance, to a change project?
Simple, Complex, and Chaotic Project, Programme, and Portfolio 
Systems: The Gap that Can, and Must, be Addressed
Key Insight 1: We argue that we have to differentiate between three different types of 
project, programme, and portfolio management: “Simple,” where requirements are known 
and the execution follows a predictable and controllable path; “Complex,” which are 
characterised by feedback loops and unforeseen emergent behaviour that can spiral out of 
control, but are fundamentally still tractable by structured (if costly and time consuming) 
analysis; and “chaotic” that, for all practical purposes, change faster than we can observe 
and learn, and are, therefore, not manageable through analytic techniques but instead rely 
on robust decision-making heuristics.
Key Insight 2: Most complex systems are perceived as chaotic, as management 
and senior leadership attempt to apply methods appropriate to “simple” systems, and 
subsequently fail.
To frame our understanding of the complexity it is valuable to introduce the concepts of simplicity and chaos. 
This creates a framework for understanding the characteristics of different types of projects, programmes, and 
portfolios. We suggest three different types of projects that require different managerial responses. (See Table 1 
for an overview, adapted from Snowden & Boone, 2007; and DeMeyer, Loch, & Pich, 2002).
Key Insight: Complex systems 
exhibit behaviours, i.e., the system 
state (state of elements and their 
relationships), as well as the 
structure of the system, that are 
in constant flux. The behaviour of 
complex systems is characterised 
by feedback loops, and non-linear 
and emergent (both planned and 
unforeseen) behaviour.
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“Simple” projects are characterised by stability and clear cause-and-effect relationships that are easily 
discernible by everyone. Often, the right answer is self-evident and undisputed. In this realm of “known knowns,” 
decisions are unquestioned because all parties share an understanding. This is typically the case in projects 
where requirements are known and the execution follows a predictable and controllable path, and thus managed 
by the use of best practices, standardisation, delegation, and communication. We can observe what happens, 
understand and categorise project conditions and necessary activities, and respond accordingly. Such projects 
are subject to variation, which can be managed through classic project-controlling techniques.
A typical example would be the construction of a single-family home by the contractor—while there are always 
variations, very similar projects have been executed many times before, the catalogue of requirements is well 
known, and all partners executing the project are familiar with one another.
“Complex” projects are characterised by feedback loops and unforeseen emergent behaviour that can spiral 
out of control, but are fundamentally still tractable by structured (if costly and time consuming) analysis. This 
domain is inherently knowable encompassing both “known unknowns” and “unknown unknowns.” Here the 
managerial strategies emphasise systems-oriented analysis, experimentation, interpretation, and involvement of 
experts in order to explore different opportunities. We need to actively investigate (i.e., analyse and model) the 
project and its environment. It will also be necessary to involve experts in the particular field of the project for its 
analysis and management. They will typically provide conflicting advice, which must be reconciled. A manager 
needs to create an environment where new ideas are heard, and that provides space for experimentation to find 
the best solutions.
An example is the development of a new generation of a car. While the project is based on a standardised 
product development process that incorporates all known best practices, it also has to deal with evolving project 
aspects—for example, customer requirements, technological capabilities, or manufacturing technologies. As 
projects may last for several years, it is more likely that key elements change during the project execution. Not 
all important information may be “knowable,” such as the strategy of the competition or the reception in the 
market of a newly introduced feature. However, through modelling and experimentation, we can reduce the 
uncertainty surrounding these factors. The critical decision becomes how much time and resources to spend on 
these activities.
“Chaotic” projects are where the relationships between cause and effect are impossible to determine because 
they shift constantly and no manageable patterns exist—only turbulence. Fundamental aspects of these projects 
are inherently unknowable and, therefore, not manageable through analytic techniques.
Examples are engineering projects that rely on basic research (e.g., on new materials, their properties, and 
manufacturing processes) that is being carried out in parallel to the main development project. The project 
management approach is turned on its head. Due to the dynamic nature of the project, and the de-facto 
impossibility of understanding and planning it analytically, the best response is to provide strong leadership 
by acting first, observing what works, and providing clear directions and ensuring effective communication to 
speed up the “sensemaking process.” Delegating authority to lower levels also gives people in the trenches 
of the project—often with the deepest understanding of the particular issue—the license to resolve it in the 
most effective way. An effective approach is also to compartmentalise the project—effectively splitting off and 
decoupling “complex” from “chaotic” sub-projects, and only relying on the results of chaotic projects as “nice 
to haves.” If these projects are executed as “complex” projects, i.e., assuming relatively stable requirements and 
relying on complex and highly mutually dependent activities and project plans, they typically fail and result in 
significant cost and budget overruns.
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Table 1: Characteristics and managerial responses in simple, complex, and chaotic project 
systems.
Aspect Simple Complex Chaotic
Example Taking a trip to the zoo2 
Building a house
Developing a new car Basic research
First-of-a-kind 
engineering project 
Characteristics Already know (known 
knowns)
Clear cause-and-effect 
relationships evident to 
everyone; right answer 
exists
Repeating patterns and 
consistent events
Knowable (“known 
unknows” and “unknown 
unknowns”)
Cause-and-effect 
relationships 
discoverable, but not 
immediately apparent to 
everyone
More than one right 
solution is possible
Unknowable
No clear cause-and-
effect relationship
High tensions
Managerial response Sense  Categorise  
Respond
Fact-based management
Ensure that best 
practices are in place
Delegate
Communicate in clear, 
direct ways (Understand 
that extensive interactive 
communication may not 
be necessary)
Probe  Sense  
Analyse  Respond
Create panels of experts
Listen to conflicting 
advice
Create environments and 
experiments that allow 
patterns to emerge
Use methods that can 
help generate ideas
Act  Sense  
Response
Look for what works
Take immediate action 
to re-establish order 
(command and control)
Provide clear, direct 
communication
Compartmentalise 
and split-off “chaotic” 
components as “nice 
to haves” from main 
project, for example, 
the development of 
an experimental new 
technology from a new 
product development 
project
2The authors acknowledge that this type of project very much depends on the moods of your kids. It may well turn into a complex or chaotic 
project.
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Although most projects, programmes, and portfolios are best described as complex systems, a significant effort 
by professionals is put into formulating experience-based best practices as managerial strategies. These often 
implicitly assume a “simple” project environment, as best practices are seen as a one-size-fits-all solution for a 
particular class of project without understanding their complex relationships to the project organisation and its 
environment. The subsequent application of ill-fitting tools and strategies may be a root cause of why project 
management (still) often fails. After a project failure, there is a tendency to blame “chaotic” externalities, which 
are unmanageable and, therefore, excuse the project failure. However, an alternative interpretation of project 
failures is that we do not yet have a proper understanding of the complexities of our projects and the right tools 
for handling them.
At the same time, we need to be aware that many aspects of a project’s complexity are not given before the 
project starts, but is an effect of the project activities throughout its lifecycle (e.g., through the way we manage 
requirements, scope, or select from alternative technical solutions). Our managerial practices in fact not only 
manage a project’s complexity, but also “design” it.
Wicked Problems: Treating Complex Projects as Simple Makes Them 
Chaotic
One type of complex project environment that is often 
encountered is based on so-called “wicked problems.” 
In short, wicked problems are those where the customer 
or user is unable to articulate clear requirements up 
front—either because we cannot articulate them until we 
experience prototype solutions (e.g., asking a non-expert 
to enumerate all characteristics of a comfortable ride 
in a car); because we have a false impression of our true 
needs (e.g., “more money would make me happier”); or 
because the technical and organisational performance and 
solution space is unknown (e.g., how reliable a particular 
technology is going to be, or how long a process is going to 
last, or what quality the resulting concept is going to have).
In an attempt to create convincing business cases, modern 
managerial practices favour “reductionist strategies,” such 
as KISS (Keep It Simple Stupid). They address the problems 
at hand as if they were simple and tame, although they 
are often complex and, as a result, wicked. However, 
Mencken’s quote “For every complex problem, there is an 
answer that is clear, simple, and wrong” reminds us that 
not every problem is solvable in the classical sense.
Acknowledging the social–technical complexity of projects, programmes, and portfolios requires a development 
of a managerial sensitivity towards the potential wickedness of the problems, instead of making it recommended 
best practice to ignore this fact of life (Rittel & Webber, 1973).
Key Insight: The vast majority 
of current project, programme, 
and portfolio management 
processes focus on “simple” 
systems. We assume that we can 
follow a staged and deterministic 
process by defining requirements, 
investigating alternative 
solutions, evaluating solutions, 
and implementing them. The 
reality, however, is characterised 
by “wicked problems”—complex 
projects where true requirements 
are unknown (or unknowable) 
before the projects start and 
develop in parallel with the solution. 
Treating them as simple often turns 
them into chaotic projects.
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The terminology of wicked problems was originally outlined within the area of social policy planning, which 
resonates with the intrinsic element of human behaviour, uncertainty, and complexity in project, programme, 
and portfolio management. The following ten elements characterise a wicked problem (Rittel & Webber, 1973):
1. There is no definitive formulation of a wicked problem.
2. Wicked problems have no stopping rule.
3. Solutions to wicked problems are not true or false, but good or bad.
4. There is no immediate and no ultimate test of a solution to a wicked problem.
5. Every solution to a wicked problem is a “one-shot operation”; because there is no opportunity to learn by 
trial and error, every attempt counts significantly.
6. Wicked problems neither have an enumerable (or an exhaustively describable) set of potential solutions 
nor a well-described set of permissible operations that may be incorporated into the plan.
7. Every wicked problem is essentially unique.
8. Every wicked problem can be considered to be a symptom of another problem.
9. The existence of a discrepancy representing a wicked problem can be explained in numerous ways. The 
choice of explanation determines the nature of the problem’s resolution.
10. The planner has no right to be wrong (i.e., planners are liable for the consequences of the actions they 
generate).
It is now customary to apply the term “wicked problem” loosely to problems that do not necessarily fulfil all 
characteristics listed at the same time. To solve a wicked problem is thus a never-ending process, where every 
proposed solution reveals aspects of the problem, which in turn causes a revision of the solution as illustrated in 
Figure 1.
 
Problem
Solution
Time
Simplified path from problem to solution
Actual iterative path from problem(s) to solution(s)
Every proposed solution…
reveals aspects of the problem….
that cause a revision of the solution.
Figure 1: The actual iterative process from problem to solution versus simplified models.
11
 March 2015
© 2015 J. Oehmen, C. Thuesen, P. Parraguez, and J. Geraldi
Several strategies have been suggested for handling the wicked problems faced by complex projects (Roberts, 
2000):
 ■ Authoritative—Reducing stakeholder complexity: These strategies seek to tame wicked problems by 
vesting the responsibility for solving the problems in the hands of a few people. The decreased number 
of stakeholders reduces project complexity, as many competing points of view are eliminated at the 
start. The disadvantage is that authorities and experts charged with solving the problem may not have an 
appreciation of all the perspectives needed to tackle the problem.
 ■ Competitive—Developing alternative system models: These strategies attempt to solve wicked 
problems by pitting opposing points of view against each other, requiring parties that hold these views 
to defend their preferred solutions. The advantage of this approach is that different solutions can be 
weighed against each other, including an assessment of to what degree they model and communicate 
the project’s complexity. The best solution is chosen. The disadvantage is that this adversarial approach 
creates a confrontational environment in which knowledge sharing is discouraged. Consequently, the 
parties involved may not have an incentive to come up with their best possible solution. Such strategies 
consume significant resources, as solutions are being developed in parallel and “against” one another.
 ■ Collaborative—Extensive system modelling: These strategies aim to engage all stakeholders in order 
to find the best possible solution for all stakeholders. Typically, this approach involves meetings in which 
issues and ideas are discussed and a common, agreed on approach is formulated. Both the competitive 
as well as the collaborative approaches rely on involving a larger group of people in the decision-
making process. This is associated with some potential pitfalls. For example, it increases the “people 
management” workload of the project manager, particularly if opposing characters and views collide, 
and subsequently require a mature culture that provides for constructive conflict resolution mechanisms. 
Also, it increases the “transaction cost” associated with project management, as it requires more time to 
be spent on communication and coordination.
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Drivers of Complexity: Relationship of Complexity, 
Uncertainty, and Human Behaviour
We previously discussed the difference between “structural” and “dynamic” complexity—the complexity of how 
a project is built, as well as the complexities of how it behaves. But what does that actually mean in practice? 
Where does this complexity come from?
Human Behaviour
1: Limited information access
2: Limited cognitive capacity and thinking biases
3: Limited time to make decisions
Uncertainty
1:  Unreliable intuitive perception of uncertainty
2: Many of our current uncertainty and risk
    management tools not fit for purpose
3:  Long life cycles and emergent behaviour increase 
    uncertainty and drive complexity
Complexity
Organisation
Technology
Dynamic ComplexityStructural Complexity
Figure 2: The sources of complexity.
We argue that there are three major drivers behind complexity: Complexity “per se,” human behaviour, and 
uncertainty, which are explored in the next sub-sections.
Key Insight: Complexity, per se, in engineering projects, programmes, and portfolios is 
determined by the technical complexity of the product system being developed, as well as 
the organisational complexity of the project, programme, and portfolio systems developing 
the product. The two systems are tightly coupled, increasing the structural and dynamic 
complexity. Uncertainty of project execution, as well as built-in behavioural patterns of 
humans, increases the complexity faced in the projects.
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Complexity per se: Organisational Complexity, Technological 
Complexity, and Their Relationships
The project manager is ultimately concerned 
with managing two types of complexity: First, the 
organisational complexity of the project itself. That 
consists of the structure of the project organisation 
(i.e., project stakeholders and their relationships), as 
well as its behaviour (i.e., project processes). Second, 
the project manager must manage the complexity 
of the main project deliverable—for example, the 
product, system, or service he or she is developing or 
delivering, including its structure (i.e., architecture) and 
“behaviour” (e.g., properties along its lifecycle, such as 
maintainability, environmental impact, or profitability 
and implementability).
Organisational (project) complexity and technical 
(deliverable) complexity are closely related to one 
another. The most relevant relationships are: 
 ■ The architecture of a deliverable typically defines a significant part of the work breakdown structure of 
a project. If the technical architecture is flawed, the integration between work packages will be difficult 
to impossible. For example, the automotive industry increased engineering project efficiency (i.e., the 
number of car models and variants brought to market per unit of engineering manpower) dramatically 
by standarising their product architecture and heavily modularising the product components. Real 
customisation is now reserved to a fraction of around 20% of car components that drive customer 
perception—such as the shape of the chassis. This radical simplification of technical complexity allowed 
a reduction of the organisational complexity. They can now simultaneously address both the customer 
need for differentiation and the business need for economies of scale and competitiveness.
 ■ The nature of a deliverable determines key project processes. For example, in order to execute an 
incremental, agile project execution, the deliverable must be “creatable” and testable in incremental 
units. While it is possible to compile and test software every night, building and testing an incrementally 
improved fighter jet every night is difficult. Project management processes must, therefore, reflect the 
realities of the nature of the deliverable, while taking full advantage of developing capabilities (e.g., 
virtual prototyping is expanding the boundary of incremental and iterative development approaches).
 ■ The number and variety of “key” stakeholders shape requirements and scope, as well as requirements 
and scope creep. Project managers must reduce an aspect of the structural complexity of the project 
(i.e., the number and diversity of key stakeholders in the governance structure) in order to limit the 
complexity of the resulting solution. “Skunk work”–type projects purport to use this strategy: an 
almost ridiculously small team of project managers and engineers develop cutting-edge innovation. 
They depend upon, among other factors, a small number of key stakeholders that ensure a consistent 
set of requirements, which can then be translated into a meaningful and consistent set of technical 
requirements, simplifying the corresponding architecture and project organisation.
Key Insight: The technological 
complexity of our product system has a 
strong influence on the organisational 
complexity of our project, programme, 
and portfolio organisational systems. 
We are better at managing the 
technical complexity of our product 
system, and fail to properly design 
and govern our (necessarily complex) 
corresponding organisational systems. 
This can lead to a deadly spiral 
of increasing organisational and 
technological complexity.
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The Impact of Human Behaviour on Complexity: Bounded Rationality, 
Decision-Making Errors, and Thinking Biases
Key Insight 1: Our human minds have limited capacity and cannot intuitively 
comprehend even mildly complex systems. To make matters worse, our intuitive decision-
making rules conspire against us in the face of complexity to produce catastrophic results. 
We are also incapable of intuitively perceiving the most fundamental aspects of complexity, 
such as feedback loops, exponential growth, or low probabilities.
Key Insight 2: Managing complex projects, programmes, or portfolios is possible but it 
requires significant conscious effort and a critical appreciation of our limitations (both of 
which can be excruciatingly difficult to achieve).
Independent of the actual complexity of a project is the way we perceive and manage this complexity. Arguably, 
regardless of its “real” complexity, what count are our perception and reaction to it.
While our brains are incredibly adaptable and able to learn, fundamentally, our ability to make sound decisions 
in the face of complexity is limited by three factors:
1. Our access to information will never be perfect and completely and accurately represent the full current 
state;
2. We have cognitive limitations—for example, regarding the number of factors we can consider in parallel, 
the amount of information we can take up, or the speed with which we can process it; and
3. The time we have to make a decision.
This leads to the phenomenon that (possibly endless) information consumes our (limited) attention, and we 
are forced to make decisions before we are “ready.” Given the fact that with rising complexity the amount of 
information tends to increase, and, therefore, the time needed to understand and process it, we are faced with a 
fundamental challenge of finding the “right” way of compressing complexity without sacrificing key aspects that 
are relevant for decision making.
Adding to these cognitive limitations, our subconscious or built-in decision-making models and rules (i.e., 
heuristics) are great for ensuring our survival in the savannah, but of limited help when managing complex 
projects. This leads to a number of challenges when we try to “intuitively” understand and deal with complexity:
 ■ Number and diversity of items: While complex systems often consist of tens, hundreds, or even 
thousands of elements and their relationships (e.g., project tasks), we can “keep in mind” only about five 
to seven items at any given time.
 ■ Dynamic behaviour and change: We subconsciously extrapolate any change as “linear”—we lack an 
“emotional appreciation” of what exponential growth means (one of the reasons why population growth 
and climate change have not led to global panic).
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 ■ Cherry picking: We reduce perceived complexity by selective attention—a subconscious “cherry picking” 
of information that fits our existing worldview and theories (selective attention). If we just bought a red 
car, all we see on the road are other red cars. The availability of information on the Internet has made the 
phenomenon worse—whatever my opinion, I will find “facts” to support it. In a project environment, this 
leads to a lack of appreciation of complexity—decision makers get stuck in a set frame of mind, and, in its 
worst case, it leads to a disconnect between the decision maker and reality.
 ■ Overconfidence and optimism bias: Even pessimists overestimate their abilities. When we analyse 
a problem or project task, we will subconsciously focus on those aspects with which we are familiar, 
good at, and that are certain. We will also prefer to start execution with “easy” tasks. This will lead 
to overly optimistic assessments of cost and schedule requirements, and chances of success. We are 
also overconfident in our abilities. Studies show that 93% of drivers believe their driving skills are 
above average (i.e., in the top 50%). We also like to select our leaders from people who exhibit strong 
confidence in themselves and the success of their people.
 ■ We were right after all: Reinforcing our overconfidence is a mechanism that adjusts the memory of our 
opinion to actual developments (hindsight bias). We typically believe (after the match) that we thought 
all along the winning team was the stronger one. In complex project environments, that creates a false 
trust in the quality of our “intuition” to foresee problems and choose the right solutions.
 ■ Our estimates are terrible (anchoring bias): We are not very good (some say terrible) at making 
estimates based on our “gut feeling.” Estimating without some level of prior data to consult, our brain 
relies on the first number it can remember (typically the last number it came across—for example, the 
day of the month) to define the order of magnitude for the estimate (Is it in the 10s or 100s?). Untrained 
estimation completely ignores even the limited information that may be available, and can be worse 
than using random numbers.
The Impact of Uncertainty on Complexity: “Feeling” and Quantifying 
Uncertainty
Key Insight 1: We are bad at intuitively dealing with uncertainty and instinctively avoid 
and distort its perception. Additionally, the concept of ambiguity describes how two 
individuals can derive completely different conclusions from the same factual, uncertainty-
related information.
Key Insight 2: To make matters worse, our structured approaches to managing 
uncertainty are fundamentally flawed in their reliance on probabilistic uncertainty 
quantifications. Non-probabilistic methods, which are a much more accurate and natural 
representation of uncertainty, are still a mostly academic pastime and in the future must be 
adopted broadly in practice.
Key Insight 3: Long lifecycles and emerging behaviour amplify uncertainty.
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Uncertainty impacts complexity in many ways. We will discuss in detail three factors: the way we humans 
perceive uncertainty, the inadequacy of our uncertainty management approaches, and the relationship of long 
project lifecycles and uncertainty.
First, there are a number of uncertainty-related thinking and decision-making biases. These make it harder 
to make the right decision under conditions of both complexity and uncertainty (which is usually the case). 
For example, we lack an intuitive appreciation for probabilities that are lower than (on the order of) 1:100 to 
1:1,000. For our subconscious decision making, even a 1:10,000,000 chance “feels” like 1:100. That is why we 
keep playing the lottery; and spend money on mitigating low-likelihood risks even if they are not potentially 
catastrophic. Combined with the large number of uncertain developments in complex projects, this becomes a 
serious issue. Similarly, we intuitively tend to neglect probabilities in our decision-making processes, focusing our 
thinking and decisions on potentially isolated, extreme situations, because they are emotionally engaging, they 
command our attention; however, they may not be representative of the key problems we face in the project. 
Thus our perception of uncertainty plays an important role in how we prioritise elements from a complex 
network of factors.
Second, the way we actively manage uncertainty does not do justice to the types of uncertainty and variety of 
information quality regarding the uncertainty we encounter in complex projects. We tend not to differentiate 
between aleatoric uncertainty (uncertainty caused by a lack of knowledge, such as the performance of a 
particular technology under field conditions) and epistemic uncertainty (fundamentally unknowable outcome, 
such as the result of a throw of dice), resulting in sub-optimal performance of complex risk situations. We also 
traditionally favour a probabilistic view of uncertainty and risk, implying a minimum amount of knowledge 
regarding an uncertainty to be there in order to arrive at a meaningful estimation of the related probability. In 
complex projects, this quality of information is, however, often unavailable, but non-probabilistic assessments 
of uncertainty (which have lower information requirements) are not typically used. This leads to inaccurate risk 
estimates and lower planning quality, thereby increasing the perceived complexity of a project.
Third, complex projects typically have long lifecycles, increasing the timeframe through which planning 
assumptions have to be projected and forecasts made. This increases the number of factors that are seriously 
affected by uncertainty. For example, while a project manager can be fairly certain of the regulatory 
environment for the next two to three years, a plane or infrastructure project with a start of construction in 15 
years must consider uncertainties from this domain. Also, complex projects or systems in general will display so-
called emerging behaviour: We can observe behaviours that are impossible (or at least very difficult) to predict 
by just understanding the single factors of the project, but are created by their mutual dependence. While the 
various shapes of snowflakes are good examples of emergence, emergent behaviour is typically negative or 
even opposed to the original intention. For example, making bike helmets mandatory (in order to reduce severe 
injuries) can lead to an increase of severe injuries in bicyclists due to dynamic overcompensation effects arising 
from human and other factors.
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Dealing with Project Complexity
The following section will discuss some selected methods to better deal with complexity in projects. This is 
not an exhaustive list, but is intended to introduce some lesser-known concepts with a particular focus on 
complexity. They focus on the three areas discussed above: Complexity “per se” (Network analysis, system 
dynamics, and modularity), Uncertainty (Antifragility), and Human Behaviour (Mindfulness).
Understanding Structural Complexity: Network Analysis
A system of interconnected elements can be modelled through 
its network architecture. It provides a quantitative and/or 
graphical representation of the interconnectedness between the 
elements, as well as describing characteristics for each of the 
constituent elements and quantifies their diversity.
As a minimum, a network-based approach will consider a list 
of elements and a binary indication about the existence—or 
absence—of a relationship between each of the elements. 
Despite the simplicity of such an elementary way of modelling 
a complex system, even basic network models allow us to gain 
insights about key features and properties of complex systems. 
For example, through network-based approaches we can measure 
interdependence, decomposability, and describe modularity in 
systems. This allows technical modularisation (sub-systems) 
as well as organisational modularization (e.g., departments 
and teams). Moreover, certain types of network configurations 
reliably suggest particular strengths and weaknesses of a complex 
system or project.
Two approaches are common: matrix-based and graph-based network analyses. While the most evident 
difference between them is representational—matrix-based approaches use square or rectangular matrices, and 
graph-based approaches use network graphs—their representational differences are rooted in different analytical 
methods, needs, and assumptions (Wyatt, Wynn, & Clarkson, 2013). Some of the most widely utilised matrix-
based approaches in engineering design and systems engineering are the Design Structure Matrix (DSM). DSM is 
a flexible method based on square matrices (also known as influence or adjacency matrices) that allows making 
explicit the connections between two elements of the same domain (Steward, 1981; Eppinger & Browning, 
2012). Typical applications are: Product architecture DSM, analysing dependencies/interactions between 
components; organisation architecture DSM, analysing communication/interactions between people; and 
process architecture DSM, analysing dependencies and information flows between activities. In addition to DSM, 
the Multi-Domain Matrix (MDM) allows mapping connections between domains (i.e., mapping organisation to 
process, process to product, etc.).
Key Insight: We can model 
the structure of systems 
through qualitative and 
quantitative approaches. We 
have methods at our disposal 
that can elucidate the system 
structure of very large and 
complex systems (e.g., the 
structure of communication 
between several thousand 
individuals). This is key for 
understanding what the 
critical elements and their 
relationships are in our 
system.
18
Complexity Management for Projects, Programmes, and Portfolios: An Engineering Systems Perspective 
© 2015 J. Oehmen, C. Thuesen, P. Parraguez, and J. Geraldi
In contrast to matrix-based approaches, graph-based approaches are more diverse, varying widely in terms 
of analytical capabilities and focus. Nonetheless, all graph-based approaches share a representation based 
on nodes and edges (although they often use different naming conventions). On one extreme, simpler graph-
based approaches do not have a quantitative intent; instead their emphasis is only on graphically summarising 
information about a type of architecture, which is the case in organisational charts, workflow diagrams, and 
basic abstract representations of a product’s architecture. On the other extreme, petri-nets, different variants of 
social network analysis, IDEF0 and IDEF3 diagrams, PERT and GERT diagrams, and so forth are not only intended 
to visualise but also explicitly quantify the network at one or more levels of analysis (Browning & Ramasesh, 
2007).
Example 1: Understanding true communication needs
In a power plant engineering project, the project manager wanted to better understand the “real” 
communication pathways within his project organisation and to outside suppliers. There were official rules and 
protocols in place, but it was unclear to what degree they were being implemented, and if they were the most 
useful configuration for a project involving thousands of people. Using network analysis, it was possible to 
understand what communication pathways were the most important; who were the “key communicators” in 
the organisation; and what groups of people were communicating amongst themselves intensively. As a result, 
the communication policy could be adapted to the real project needs—for example, regarding the composition, 
frequency, and content of regular coordination meetings; newsletter-type information dissemination; 
establishment of direct communication between key partners; and review of the activity-critical communication 
interfaces. Figure 3 shows a graphical representation of communication partners (nodes), and communication 
between partners (edges). The size of the node indicates communication intensity, and the colour of the node 
indicates clusters of communicating parties (i.e., a group of people with a high degree of communication within).
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Figure 3: Communication network and clusters, based on analyses of emails in a biomass plant engineering project. Colours represent 
clusters. Node size represents centrality.
Example 2: Aligning organisational and technological structures
This next application of network analysis does not rely on a big data set, but is based on a manual modelling 
of the information flow between processes (project management and engineering), as well as the modelling 
of the dependence between technical components. The system being designed is a biomass power plant. 
Based on a model of the technical dependencies of the system, the engineering activities were aligned in 
such a way that each development team focused on well-defined sub-systems. This minimised the need for 
coordination between teams (as technical sub-systems were defined through a network analysis of their 
dependencies to have minimal dependencies at their interfaces, and maximum dependencies within). The same 
way, project management or procurement processes can be designed to minimise the need for cross-boundary 
communication. In Figure 4 it is possible to see the results of modelling the design process architecture as 
a design structure matrix (DSM) and as a graph. Through these representations it is possible, for example, 
to identify modular and integrative processes; understand which subsystems are the ones with the highest 
influences should an engineering change be introduced; and, help to redesign the process to better align with the 
architecture of the product or the organisation.
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Air and Flue 
Gas
Boiler and
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COMOS
Data
Combustion
System
Electrical
Control and 
Instrumentation
External
Piping
Load Plan
and Layout
Overall
Project 
Management
PFD and
P&ID
Pressure
Parts Design Procurement
Design of 
steel
structures
Air and Flue Gas 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.3 0.0 1.0 0.3 0.7 0.0 0.7 0.7
Boiler and Equipment
Design
1.0 0.7 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0
COMOS Data 0.7 0.0 0.7 1.0 0.7 0.0 0.3 0.7 0.7 0.0 0.0
Combustion System 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.3 0.0 1.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0
Electrical Control and 
Instrumentation
0.3 0.0 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.7 0.0
External Piping 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3 1.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.7
Load Plan and Layout 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0
Overall Project 
Management
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 1.0 0.3
PFD and P&ID 0.7 0.3 1.0 0.7 1.0 0.7 0.0 0.3 0.7 0.0 0.0
Pressure Parts Design 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.3 0.0 1.0 0.3 0.7 0.7 0.0
Procurement 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.3
Design of steel 
structures
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.7
Integrative sub-
system tasks
Modular sub-
system tasks
Integrative 
work tasks
Strength of 
information 
dependency 
between 
tasks
Process Architecture (matrix form)
Process Architecture (graph form)
 
Figure 4: Process architecture in matrix and graph forms as a simplified illustration of network complexity.
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Understanding Dynamic Complexity: System Dynamics
System dynamics is an analysis and simulation technique developed to target socio–technical systems. It is 
targeted at overcoming key issues in working with complex systems, such as bounded rationality, flawed and 
oversimplified mental models, and thinking and decision-making biases.
 
Amount of money 
I earn"
Amount of money in my 
bank account"
Amount of money"
I spend"R" B"
+" +"
+" –"
Figure 5: Example of system dynamics with financial flows.
System dynamics consists of a number of simple building blocks, such as the variables and the positive 
(reinforcing) and negative (balancing) relationships between them as shown in Figure 5. Developing a complete 
and reasonably accurate system dynamics model of any concrete problems will require expert support. 
However, in a first step, it can be used to develop a qualitative model of the system, highlighting key factors, 
their relationships, and some fundamental dynamic behaviour of the system. For example, a system model that 
only shows reinforcing (positive) relationships between its elements will be prone to runaway effects—either 
exponential growth or crash. A stable system—and project—will always require a balancing influence that will 
stabilise its performance after a growth or decline phase.
System dynamics models can be crucial to gain clarity regarding both the structural, and through simulation 
runs, also the dynamic complexity of a project. System dynamics models for projects typically focus on 
understanding particular project elements (e.g., decision-making processes at milestones), the impact and 
optimisation of rework cycles (particularly for development projects), optimising control processes to adjust 
project execution to stay within budget, scope, and schedule, and root causes and countermeasures to 
“emerging behaviour,” such as policy resistance, unintended consequences, and ripple effects (Sterman, 2000).
Example: How decreasing project delays increases them
In the late 1980s, managers and researchers became interested in better understanding the processes of 
developing increasingly complex software. They used a systems dynamics approach to study and model why 
Key Insight: We can qualitatively and quantitatively model the behaviour of moderately 
complex systems (on the order of 10 to 30 elements—for example, the behaviour of 
different groups in a project organisation). This relies on understanding reinforcing and 
balancing feedback loops, as well as creating an understanding of how their combination 
and configuration can lead to typical types of system behaviour.
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most companies were so unsuccessful in bringing projects back on track once they had been delayed. Even more 
puzzling, projects seemed to recover after an initial intervention, but then degraded quickly into failures. Figure 
6 shows a small slice of the model that was developed to understand the problem and articulate to project 
managers where they went wrong: The intention was to increase labour quantity by increasing work intensity 
and overtime, based on the forecasted delay. While we would expect this to solve the problem, a “background 
mechanism” is at work that causes the opposite effect: While fatigue is low in the beginning and suggests the 
strategy is successful, its exponentially increasing negative effect on productivity will soon negate any positive 
effect of increased work intensity.
Similar models have been developed to explain a range of other counterintuitive phenomena—for example, why 
increasing the staffing level of a project (to increase work intensity) typically also results in a decrease of work 
output (the most experienced and productive people are suddenly busy training the new arrivals). These models 
help understand what the limits of our strategies are (e.g., for how long does increased work intensity help me, 
or what is an ideal rate of personnel ramp-up in a project).
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Figure 6: Why bringing a project back on track delays it more (adapted from Abdel-Hamid & Madnick, 1991).
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Reducing Structural Organisational Complexity: Black-Boxing and 
Modularity
Modularity is a crucial strategy for managing complexity—
enabling organisations to create products and services 
meeting individual customers’ needs while still leveraging 
the benefits of similarity and standardisation. Modularity is 
a general systems concept, typically defined as a continuum 
describing the degree to which a system’s components may 
be separated and recombined (Schilling, 2000). Usually it 
refers to both the tightness of coupling between components 
and the degree to which the “rules” of the system 
architecture enable (or prohibit) the mixing and matching of 
components. Given the open-ended nature of the concept, 
it is used in a variety of fields, including biology, nature, 
ecology, mathematics, cognitive science, industrial design, 
manufacturing, programming, and art and architecture.
Product modularity (product design modularity)
Product design modularity has thus far received the greatest attention. With the onset in platforms thinking, 
Meyer and Lehnerd (1997) described the architecture of a product as being the combination of subsystems and 
interfaces. They argued that every product is modular and that the goal is to make that architecture common 
across many variants. Product modularity can also be viewed as a method by which the functions of the product 
are mapped towards the physical components, thus defining the product architecture as the arrangement of 
functional elements, the mapping from functional elements to physical components, and the specification of 
interfaces between these (Ulrich, 1995).
The use of product architecture with well-defined modules has proved to contribute to significant increases in 
industrial productivity, since implementation of product architecture with well-defined interfaces maintained 
over many years makes it possible to execute design projects and develop production processes that are more 
productive. One reason is that the well-defined interfaces make it considerably simpler to coordinate the 
individual sub-processes that are typically carried out by different organisational groups.
Process and organisational modularity
According to Campagnolo and Camuffo (2010) process modularity “within and among organizations mirrors 
the degree of product modularity, with the main consequence that independent companies (e.g., suppliers) 
may develop, produce and deliver self-contained modules consistent with the scope and depth of their core 
competences” (p. 269). Thereby, modularity not only is a characteristic of a product, but also the processes/task/
activities for producing it. One of the consequences of focusing on modular processes is that the end product 
might be intangible like a service or experience (Pine & Gilmore, 1999).
Organisational modularity can be understood as the way organisations are structured. Significant effort has 
been spent on developing new organisational paradigms “characterized by flatter hierarchies, decentralized 
decision-making, greater capacity for tolerance of ambiguity, permeable internal and external boundaries, 
empowerment of employees, capacity renewal, self-organizing units, and self-integrating co-ordination 
mechanisms” (Campagnolo & Camuffo, 2010, p. 274).
Key Insight: The concept 
of modularity has long been 
successful to better manage 
structural–technical complexity. 
It can also be successfully 
applied to project, programme, 
and portfolio organisations, 
creating sub-groups and 
focusing on their “plug-and-play” 
interface integration.
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Particularly interesting is the relationship between product and organisational modularity:
Integral products should be developed by integral organizations (tightly connected 
organizational units to maximize ease of communication and minimize the risk of 
opportunism). Modular products should be developed by autonomous, loosely coupled, easily 
reconfigurable organizations. Indeed, the adoption of standards reduces the level of asset 
specificity (Argyres, 1999) and, in turn, the need to exercise managerial authority. Product 
modularity also reduces the need for communication due to information hiding, whereby 
knowledge about the ‘interior’ of each module does not need to be shared (Campagnolo & 
Camuffo, 2010, p. 274).
The above-mentioned categories of modularity can all be applied in the management of projects, programmes, 
and portfolios. In fact, since modularity is an attribute of a complex system, every project is modular to some 
extent and some of the well-known tools and practices, including work breakdown structure, organisational 
charts, and activity planning are all developed for designing and managing the modularity of projects.
From a modularity perspective, a project might be seen as a puzzle where the pieces fit more or less together. If 
the pieces fit together well, the project will be characterised by order, efficiency, and high reliability; but, if the 
pieces do not match, resources are needed to negotiate and align the interfaces, resulting in high complexity, 
inefficiency, and uncertainty. Consequently, the traditional project managerial practices strive for developing 
systems with a well-defined modularity. On the other hand, it is important to notice that a poor modularity 
introduces uncertainties, which may offer potential elements for creativity and innovation.
Example: Standardisation and modularisation of installation shafts in building projects
Installation shafts are an exemplary case in the 
development of complexity of construction products 
and practices. Following the general technological 
development, the shafts have become increasingly 
complex. Consequently, today an average installation 
shaft requires around 300 operations by 9 to 10 
technical crafts, done in a space of 0,6 x 0,8 m with 
one-sided access and very difficult working conditions 
(Thuesen & Hvam, 2012). Although every profession 
in the project has a share in the design and production 
of the shaft, nobody takes full responsibility for the 
realisation of the shaft, and as a consequence the 
executing contractors usually face a significant project 
risk. Facing this challenge, the Scandinavian contractor 
decided to develop a flexible shaft based on the ideas of modularity as a way of managing complexity. The 
underlying idea of the developed solution is that all vertical installations of the main routes are concentrated in a 
shaft, which is split horizontally into factory-produced units corresponding to each floor. The units are produced 
offsite in an industrial process and transported to the building site in order to be installed concurrently with the 
erection of the base building/main structure, as illustrated in Figure 7. Some of the effects of new modularity are:
Figure 7: Installation shafts before and after the application of 
modularity as a tool for managing complexity.
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 ■ Significant reduction in assembly time onsite from three weeks to seven minutes for each.
 ■ Assembly of the shaft by one craftsman (concrete worker) works particularly well—significantly reducing 
the number of craftsmen involved during the onsite production.
 ■ The in situ pouring of concrete after the assemblage results in tight slaps—an effect usually impossible to 
achieve with the traditional construction practices.
 ■ Buy-in from the project workers, making the further implementation less challenging.
 ■ The designing project team was “forced” to develop integrated data models, clear communication 
interfaces, and collaboration processes—a process standardisation and modularisation driven by a 
technical one. Although theoretically a more complex design task, the quality and productivity of the 
design process were actually improved.
Antifragility: Thriving on Uncertainty and Volatility
Antifragility is a management concept that seeks to 
establish organisations that thrive in uncertain and volatile 
environments. Fragile organisations (e.g., parts of our banking 
system) can suffer significant harm through volatility. 
Robust organisations (e.g., a project with ample buffers, 
management by deep pockets) are able to survive volatility 
and absorb its interference. Antifragile organisations, 
however, are designed to take maximum advantage of 
volatility and grow and improve as they are exposed to 
it. A classic example is evolution where “fitter” species 
survive and, over time, fill every niche in an ecosystem. The 
antifragile organisation derives more benefit than harm from 
volatility.
The antifragile mindset takes a rather radical approach and advocates much less top-down planning in favour 
of the ability to re-organise as a response to a disturbance or failure. At the core of antifragility is the conviction 
that planning is, to a large extent, futile, as unforeseeable events keep destroying our carefully laid out plans and 
detailed schedules. The following overview is an adaptation of advice to create antifragile organisations (Taleb, 
2012a; 2012b):
 ■ Antifragility Rule 1: Think of projects as human bodies, not machines. Sophisticated machines rely 
on a central plan, expert operators, and continuous outside maintenance. Human bodies self-heal and 
actually require “disorder” to survive (exposure to viruses to keep our immune system intact, stress on 
our bones to keep them healthy, and, if they break, they grow back stronger). We run projects aiming 
at stability. Instead, we must allow natural fluctuations to continuously show weaknesses in our 
organisation, and have a decentralised ability to fix them as they occur. Central interventions should be 
saved for life-and-death situations, to allow the projects decentralised repair mechanisms to develop and 
strengthen.
Key Insight: The concept of 
antifragile projects describes an 
organisation that grows stronger 
with each failure, embraces 
structured experimentation, and 
values learning. We are able to 
make better decisions without 
the illusion of being able to 
predict “the next big thing.”
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 ■ Antifragility Rule 2: Create project portfolios that can collectively learn from the others’ 
mistakes. The airline industry has an aspect of antifragility: A plane crash triggers a thorough system-
wide response. Root causes are analysed, lessons learned shared globally, and the implementation 
of identified remedies is mandatory. In the project management community, knowledge sharing 
and incorporating lessons learned are considered old news, but we are still not good at it. In order to 
be antifragile, this cross-project learning must be organic and not lead to an unwieldy (and fragile) 
centralised monstrosity.
 ■ Antifragility Rule 3: Small projects and project teams are efficient. Large projects and organisations 
promise to deliver value by utilising economies of scale. But they also introduce fragility: “To see how 
large things can be fragile, consider the difference between an elephant and a mouse: The former breaks 
a leg at the slightest fall, while the latter is unharmed by a drop several multiples of its height. This 
explains why we have so many more mice than elephants” (Taleb, 2012b). Large projects are inherently 
more risky than small projects—the maximum possible loss is bigger. They also tend to overrun their 
planned cost more frequently. In project management, the exponential increase in “transaction cost” 
quickly offsets any economies of scale. The goal is to use a small team to do what a large team failed 
to do, instead of increasing team size and making the organisational challenges even worse. This lesson 
was implemented at Lockheed Martin’s Skunk Works in the 1950s, where they designed ultra-modern 
military planes with just a handful of people. In many software development companies today, large 
development teams are replaced with a small team around a gifted software architect. This also requires 
that we as project managers abandon the idea that a bigger team and bigger budget mean bigger status.
 ■ Antifragility Rule 4: Fail often, fail cheaply. Tinkering and trial-and-error approaches are central to 
any innovation. Almost all big leap forwards—from Thomas Edison’s light bulb to Steve Job’s iPod—rest 
on a pile of mostly invisible failures. The key requirement is that experiments and risk-taking come 
cheap, so you can keep at it until a solution emerges as opposed to betting the house (typically once). In 
project environments, this idea can mean anything from exposing end-users to hundreds of cardboard 
prototypes (or software interfaces consisting of flipcharts and sticky notes), to creating virtual simulation 
and testing environments that allow use of a semi-automatic testing of more complex technical 
challenges.
 ■ Antifragility Rule 5: Project managers must have real skin in the game. Taking big risks with someone 
else’s resources is very different from taking big risks with one’s own. We typically provide incentives for 
success—in fact creating a reward for excessive risk taking, as the “upside risk” is much more attractive 
than the “downside risk” is off-putting (we can always blame a failure on someone else). Decision-
making and reward structures must align with the long-term objectives of a project or organisation. This 
includes continued responsibility of project managers throughout the extensive lifecycle of a project (and 
possibly the resulting system the project creates).
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Mindfulness: Constructively Dealing with Our Thinking Biases
The behaviour resulting from our thinking and 
decision-making biases are inherently human, but 
constitute a risk to any project. Yet, we can discipline 
our minds to think sharper, quicker, and clearer. 
Internalisation of mindfulness principles offers one 
approach to do so. Mindfulness is understood as 
“a rich awareness of discriminatory detail. By that 
we mean that when people act, they are aware of 
context, of ways in which details differ (in other 
words, they discriminate among details), and of 
deviations from their expectations” (Weick & 
Sutcliffe, 2001, p. 32). In other words, mindfulness is 
about keeping a high level of alertness and awareness 
of context and using this awareness in our decisions and actions. Mindful project managers know that they 
do not know everything. That, despite their experience, new types of problems can happen. They are aware of 
cognitive biases and fight against their wish to confirm initial assumptions. They seek for deviations, engage with 
different perspectives of the project and attempt to create a more comprehensive understanding of the current 
problem and ways to solve it.
Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) developed five principles of mindfulness. The first three principles explore ways in 
which project managers can anticipate problems. Yet, as we mentioned above, we are fallible, and managers 
should be concerned not only with prevention but also with cures. In this regard, the last two suggested 
principles focus on reacting to unexpected events and containing their negative consequences. The objective 
of these principles is to develop more reliable organisations, i.e., organisations that can reduce devastating 
impacts of unexpected events and recover rapidly. Therefore, in the project management domain, mindfulness 
is particularly instrumental in managing the intersection between human behaviour and uncertainty. The 
principles were developed for repetitive operations, and in particular organisations such as healthcare, nuclear 
power plants, and aircraft. Yet, they are also applicable to the project management context (see for example, 
Denyer, Kutsch, & Lee-Kelley, 2011). They provide some pointers and a starting point in the journey to improving 
cognition.
Key Insight: While we cannot 
completely dissolve our cognitive 
limitations, we can discipline our 
minds by becoming aware of our 
“irrationalities” and inspiring ourselves 
to act in a mindful manner. Our 
behaviour will become more like we 
thought it was anyway—rational and 
fact-based.
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Table 2: Examples of mindfulness in project management.
Principle Description
Reluctance to simplify Simplify slowly, reluctantly, and mindfully. Be careful with simplified 
explanations and categories, such as make or buy, or right or wrong. 
Problems faced in projects are more nuanced and often offer more options. 
Preoccupation with failure “Pay close attention to weak signals of failure that may be symptoms of 
larger problems within the system” (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001, p. 46). 
Develop practices to preclude mistakes that have strategic, negative 
impact on the project, such as clearly articulating and communicating 
these potential, unacceptable mistakes to project stakeholders.
Sensitivity to operations Be responsive to the messy reality inside of projects. This involves, on the 
one hand, controlling project progress, and looking for potential deviations 
and their implications to the project as a whole, and on the other, being 
mindful to the potential unexpected events that go beyond what one 
would usually control in the project context. 
Commitment to resilience Accept that unexpected events will occur and that project managers need 
to react to them quickly. Resilience involves (a) the ability to absorb strain 
and preserve the functioning of the project—the show must go on; (b) 
ability to recover quickly; (c) ability to learn from the unexpected event 
and how it impacted the project.
Deference to expertise Deference to expertise is not about assigning an expert to a problem—for 
instance, a risk practitioner who will then be doing risk management so the 
project manager can manage other aspects of the project. Such behaviour 
can cause more harm than good. This is about giving voice to experts 
actively involved in the project. They are the ones who first notice early 
weak signals of mistakes, but are also often powerless, afraid to speak up, 
and even may not realise how important some deviations might be to the 
entire project.
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Conclusion
Complexity is integral to the management of projects, programmes, and portfolios. The topic has received wide 
attention from project management practitioners and academics alike. Yet, we still have a poor understanding 
of complexity embedded in projects and, above all, we still insist on denying or playing down the complexity 
of our projects. We assume that we can follow a staged and deterministic process by defining requirements, 
investigating alternative solutions, evaluating solutions and implementing them. The consequence is the use of 
inappropriate managerial responses, leading to inefficiencies, frustration, and ultimately failure.
This paper offered some concepts and management approaches to understanding, accepting, and managing 
the complexity of projects, programmes, and portfolios appropriately. Our intention was to move outside of 
the project management literature in an attempt to bring new insights to the area. Our emphasis focused on 
the complexity involved in projects and programmes that shape engineering systems, for example, energy 
generation and distribution, transportation infrastructure, healthcare, or defense. By looking at engineering 
systems, we bring difficult and abstract concepts to the reality of managing projects, and articulate implications 
to practice.
This whitepaper contributes to literature and practice in three ways. First, it builds on the existing research on 
complexity in general and in projects (Williams, 2005; Geraldi, Maylor, & Williams, 2011; Maylor, Turner, & 
Murray-Webster, 2013; Snowden & Boone, 2007; Rittel & Webber, 1973) to define complexity as a combination 
of three concepts: structural complexity, uncertainty, and human behaviour. What this whitepaper adds is the 
analysis of how these elements are intertwined, and with what consequences to the management of projects. 
The second contribution is to offer cutting-edge concepts developed outside of the project management domain 
to embrace and manage complexity in projects. Finally, the whitepaper makes these abstract concepts more 
concrete and, by doing so, more visible to practitioners and academics. We do this by illustrating the concepts 
and potential implications and management approaches with concrete examples.
What we are not saying is that we have a silver bullet to managing complexity—yet another best practice on 
managing complexity. Instead, we hope to have raised awareness of the difficulty and to have encouraged the 
reader to embrace the complexities of projects.
We are at the cutting edge of management practices and, therefore, approaches are still under development. 
Research here is focused on discovery, not validation. Similarly, application of these concepts demands reflective 
practitioners who are willing to experiment, and sensitivity to context to discover what works and what does 
not. We are interested in moving this agenda forward and, in order to do so, the close collaboration between 
academics and practitioners is crucial. We look forward to engaging with practitioners willing to discover new 
approaches along with their counterparts in academia.
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